Introduction
network in the graph (N, L) if S is connected in the graph, i.e., for any i, j ∈ S, i = j, there is a path in S from i to j. Notice that the empty set and all singleton coalitions are networks by definition. Any two members in a network are able to communicate with each other directly or indirectly through other players in the same network. A coalition S of players is called a component in the graph (N, L) if S forms a network and S cannot form a larger network with any other player j ∈ N \ S. A sequence of at least three different nodes (i 1 , . . . , i k ′ ) is called a cycle in the graph (N, L) if (1) it is a path in (N, L) and (2) A tree (N, T ) is a directed graph, with T a collection of exactly n − 1 directed edges, such that from exactly one node, called the root, there is a unique directed path to every other node. In a tree the root has no predecessor and any other player has exactly one predecessor. On the other hand, a player may have multiple successors. A player j is a subordinate of i in T if T contains a directed path from i to j. Given an undirected graph (N, L), a tree (N, T ) is a spanning tree of (N, L) if (i, j) ∈ T implies {i, j} ∈ L, i.e., any directed edge in T is an undirected edge in L.
In the game (N, v, L), a coalition S of players can only cooperate and realize its worth v(S) if S forms a network. In the rest of the paper, we assume without loss of generality that N is connected, so N itself forms a network and can realize its worth v(N ). Otherwise, the analysis can be done analogously for each component in the graph (N, L).
When each pair of players can communicate directly, i.e., L = {{i, j} | i = j, i, j ∈ N }, (N, v, L) is said to be a game with complete communication structure and often shortly denoted by (N, v).
A payoff vector x ∈ R n of (N, v, L) is an n-dimensional vector giving a payoff x i ∈ R to every player i ∈ N. We write x(S) = i∈S x i for S ∈ C L (N ). A payoff vector x is efficient if x(N) = v(N ), i.e., it fully distributes the worth v(N) of the grand coalition N to all its members. A solution for games with communication structure is a mapping F that assigns to every game with communication structure (N, v, L) a set of payoff vectors
is efficient. The best-known set-valued solution for games (N, v) is the core, see Gillies [6] , which assigns to every game (N, v) the set C(N, v) = {x ∈ R n | x(N) = v(N ), and x(S) ≥ v(S), for all S ∈ 2 N } of undominated efficient payoff vectors. With full communication, a payoff vector x is dominated if there exists a coalition S such that x(S) < v(S). However, for games with communication structure (N, v, L), a coalition S can only cooperate if it forms a network and so a payoff vector x can only be dominated by networks. Consequently, for games with communication structure (N, v, L) the core becomes equal to the set C(N, v, L) given by
i.e., the core is the set of efficient payoff vectors that are not dominated by any network S.
i.e., the value of coalition S equals the sum of the values of its components in (S, L(S)).
The best-known single-valued solution for games (N, v) is the Shapley value, see Shapley [16] , which assigns to every game (N, v) the average φ(N, v) of all n! marginal vectors m π (v) ∈ R n of the game (N, v), where π = (π(1), . . . , π(n)) is a permutation π : N → N assigning a unique number π(i) ∈ N to every player i ∈ N and m
Myerson value, see Myerson [13] , is a single-valued solution assigning to every (N, v, L) the Shapley value φ(N, v L ) of the Myerson restricted game.
The average tree solution
In this section we present a new single-valued solution for games with communication structure. The new solution generalizes the average tree solution for games with cycle-free communication structure as introduced in Herings et al. [9] . For a game with cycle-free communication structure (N, v, L) the average tree solution is the average of n specific payoff vectors. More precisely, each payoff vector corresponds to one player and this vector is determined by the unique spanning tree (N, T ) for the cycle-free graph (N, L) in which that player is the root of the tree. On the class of games with cycle-free communication structure the average tree solution has been axiomatized by component efficiency and component fairness. In [9] it is also shown that if the characteristic function of the game satisfies superadditivity, the average tree solution lies in the core C(N, v, L).
To extend and generalize the average tree solution to the class of all games with communication structure, first notice that when a graph (N, L) is not cycle-free, not all links are needed to communicate. For a particular player i, every spanning tree on (N, L) having player i as root describes a possibility in which player i is able to communicate with the other players. We only consider spanning trees in which any player is linked to just one successor in every component of the set of his subordinates. To describe this class of spanning trees, we first give the definition of an admissible n-tuple of coalitions. (1) For all i ∈ N, i ∈ B i , and for some j ∈ N, B j = N ; (2) For all i ∈ N and K ∈ C L (B i \ {i}), we have K = B j and {i, j} ∈ L for some j ∈ N.
Condition (2) of Definition 3.1 states that for every i ∈ N each component in the subgraph (B i \ {i}, L(B i \ {i})) is equal to B h for some player h being linked to player i. The same condition also implies that every set B i is a network.
Given an admissible n-tuple of coalitions B, we interpret B i as the set of subordinates of player i together with player i himself. We define the directed graph (N, T B )
as
The notion of admissible n-tuples has the following properties. (1) There exists a unique player i ∈ N such that B i = N .
is a spanning tree.
Proof. From Condition (1) of Definition 3.1 it follows that B i = N for some i ∈ N. By Condition (2) of Definition 3.1, for every K ∈ C L (B i \ {i}) there exists j ∈ N such that K = B j and {i, j} ∈ L, which leads to edges (i, j) of T B . Next we continue this procedure with every j chosen in the previous step for which the network B j is not a singleton. We proceed in this way until all remaining networks are singletons. It follows immediately that T B is a spanning tree, which proves (3). Observe that, for all j ∈ N, B j \ {j} is the set of subordinates of player j in the spanning tree T B . Therefore, there is a unique i ∈ N for which B i = N, which proves (1).
To prove (2) consider two nodes i and j. Because T B is a spanning tree, either
It remains to be shown that B i ∪ B j is not a network in the last case. Since T B is a spanning tree, there is j ′ = i, j such that
Let B j ′ be the minimal set with these properties. Moreover, there is no
Property (2) of Lemma 3.2 says that if B i and B j are two different components in C L (B k \ {k}) for some k ∈ N, then there is no link in the graph (N, L) between any player of B i and any player of B j . This means that for any two players, if in T B one player is not a subordinate of the other, they cannot communicate directly with each other in the graph (N, L). In the spanning tree T B , the root player i communicates with a subordinate
Then B j = K and on his turn, player j communicates with his subordinates through his successors in the components in C L (B j \ {j}), and so on.
The following example illustrates the concept of admissible n-tuples and their induced spanning trees. The two sets of admissible n-tuple of coalitions with B 1 = N induce two spanning trees with player 1 as root, the spanning tree T 1 = {(1, 2), (2, 3), (3, 4)} in case B 2 = {2, 3, 4} and the spanning tree T 2 = {(1, 4), (4, 3), (3, 2)} in case B 4 = {2, 3, 4}.
Observe that there are also two other spanning trees with player 1 as root, namely T 3 = {(1, 2), (1, 4), (2, 3)} and T 4 = {(1, 2), (1, 4), (4, 3)}, but these spanning trees do not correspond to an admissible n-tuple of coalitions, because player 1 has two successors in
As shown in the example, the set of spanning trees induced by the collection of admissible n-tuples of coalitions is typically a proper subset of the collection of all spanning trees of (N, L). To define the average tree solution for the class of all games with communication structure we only consider spanning trees induced by admissible n-tuples of coalitions. 
At m B (N, v, L) every player i ∈ N receives a payoff equal to the worth of network B i minus the total worths of the components of (B i \ {i}, L(B i \ {i})). With respect to the corresponding spanning tree T B , the marginal contribution gives to every player the value of the network consisting of himself and his subordinates minus the total payoff assigned to his subordinates. Notice that a marginal contribution vector m
We remark that spanning trees that are not induced by an admissible n-tuple of coalitions do not yield a payoff vector that has this property. We now define the average tree solution as the average of all marginal contribution vectors over the collection of admissible n-tuples of coalitions.
Definition 3.5 Average tree solution
On the class of all games with communication structure (N, v, L) , the average tree (AT) solution assigns the payoff vector AT(N, v, L) given by
The number of admissible n-tuples depends on the structure of the graph (N, L). In the next section we discuss two special cases, cycle-free graphs and complete graphs. Proof. For some i ∈ N , take B i = N . Since the graph is cycle-free and connected, player i is linked to exactly one player in each component of N \ {i}. For given K ∈ C L (N \ {i}), let j ∈ K be the unique player such that {i, j} ∈ L. Then, by Condition (2) of Definition 3.1,
Continuing this procedure as long as there are components consisting of more than one player, we obtain the unique admissible n-tuple of coalitions with B i = N.
Using this lemma we show that for games with cycle-free communication structure the average tree solution coincides with the solution introduced in Herings et al. [9] for this particular class of games. When (N, L) is cycle-free, let T i , i ∈ N , be the unique spanning tree with node i as its root. For a game with cycle-free communication structure (N, v, L), the spanning tree T i determines a marginal contribution vector m i (N, v, L) with payoff
where, for j ∈ N, K i j is the set of nodes consisting of j and all its subordinates in T i . The average tree solution for games with cycle-free communication structure as introduced in Herings et al. [9] then yields the average of these n marginal contribution vectors. 
Proof. By Lemma 4.1 we have that for any i ∈ N there is a unique admissible n-tuple of coalitions with B i = N . Let B(i) be this n-tuple of coalitions. From the construction in the proof of Lemma 4.1, it follows immediately that the spanning tree T B(i) corresponding to B(i) coincides with the unique spanning tree T i having i as its root. Hence
Next we prove that for games with complete communication structure the average tree solution coincides with the Shapley value. Proof. For an arbitrarily chosen player i 1 ∈ N, we consider the collection of all admissible n-tuples B with B i 1 = N . Since the graph (N, L) is complete, N \ {i 1 } is connected and thus consists of exactly one component. For any arbitrarily chosen i 2 in N \ {i 1 } we can set B i 2 = N \ {i 1 }, since i 1 is connected with every other player. The network B i 2 \ {i 2 } consists of exactly one component and for every i 3 ∈ B i 2 \ {i 2 } we can set B i 3 = B i 2 \ {i 2 }. Continuing in this way at each step k, k = 1, . . . , n, we can take an arbitrarily chosen player i k in B i k−1 \ {i k−1 } and set B i k = B i k−1 \ {i k−1 }, where B i k = N when k = 1. Since at each step, any player in the remaining set can be chosen, there are n! admissible n-tuples of coalitions. Observe that for a complete graph each of the n! admissible n-tuples of coalitions generates a path graph, i.e., each player has exactly one successor and one predecessor, except the first chosen player who has no predecessor and the last chosen player who has no successor. On the other hand, any given path graph corresponds to the permutation in which the last chosen player enters first, the second last chosen player enters second, and so on.
Core properties
In this section we provide conditions for arbitrary games with communication structure under which the average tree solution lies in the core. For a game (N, v) it is well-known that the Shapley-value φ(N, v) is in the core C(N, v) if the game is convex, the requirement that v(S) + v(T ) ≤ v(S ∪ T ) + v(S ∩ T ) for every S, T ⊂ N. A game is superadditive if these inequalities are satisfied for every S and T such that S ∩ T = ∅. Superadditivity is insufficient to ensure that a game has a non-empty core. We say that a game with
is superadditive. It can be shown that a superadditive game with cycle-free communication structure has a non-empty core. In particular, it follows from Demange [5] that any marginal contribution vector
L is permutationally convex for any permutation corresponding to the spanning tree T i and then, according to Granot and Huberman [7] ,
So, for superadditive games with cycle-free communication structure the average tree solution is in C(N, v, L), because the core is convex. Also for games with cycle-free communication structure, Talman and Yamamoto [18] provide a condition even weaker than superadditivity under which the average tree solution is still in the core. We next introduce the notion of link-convexity, which will be shown to assure that the average tree solution is an element of the core for an arbitrary game with communication structure.
Definition 5.1 Link-convexity
for any S, T ⊂ N that satisfy
(1) S, T, S \ T, T \ S, and (S \ T ) ∪ (T \ S) are non-empty networks,
Notice that Condition (1) of Definition 5.1 implies that S ∪ T is a non-empty network. Link-convexity reduces to convexity for the class of games with complete communication structure because for those games all subsets of N are networks and convexity is satisfied trivially when S, T, S \ T, or T \ S equals the empty set. We illustrate the concept of link-convexity with an example. Without loss of generality assume that j ≥ i. Then the condition that S \ T and T \ S are non-empty, requires that j > i. Now, if j = i ′ + 1 then we must have that j
is not a network. Therefore, for the game with cyclic communication structure the link-convexity property requires that
the two sets must be such that S ∪ T and S ∩ T are both networks.
The next theorem shows that the average tree solution is in the core if the game is link-convex. 
Proof. We show that under link-convexity any marginal contribution vector
, is an element of C(N, v, L), which proves the result because the core is a convex set.
, take any S ∈ C L (N ) and let S 1 , . . . , S k ′ be the components in the subgraph (S, T B (S)). Since S k is connected, the directed subgraph (S k , T B (S k )) is a tree and there exists a unique r k ∈ S k such that S k ⊂ B r k , k = 1, . . . , k ′ . Notice that r k is the root of (S k , T B (S k )). We define I = {r 1 , . . . , r k ′ }.
By Property (2) of Lemma 3.2, either B i ⊂ B j \ {j} or B j ⊂ B i \ {i} or B i ∩ B j = ∅ for every pair i, j ∈ I. Since S is a network and because of Property (2) of Lemma 3.2 it holds that there is one node, say, r k ′ , such that for every i ∈ I \ {r k ′ } the node i is a subordinate of r k ′ and therefore
set of successors of S k in the tree T B outside S. We define J = ∪ i∈I F i as the set of all such successors. For j ∈ J, let
We define N = I ∪ J and the directed graph ( N , T ) by
Clearly, ( N, T ) is a tree with root r k ′ .
Without loss of generality, let r 1 , . . . , r k ′ be such that
Consider some k ∈ {1, . . . , k ′ } and write
and B j ℓ satisfy Conditions (1) and (2) of Definition 5.1. Notice that the components of their (possibly empty) intersection are the networks B i for i ∈ H j ℓ and that B j ℓ \ (∪ i∈H j ℓ B i ) is linked to S k . Now it follows from link-convexity that for l = 1, . . . , l ′ ,
By repeated application of this argument and since
Notice that this formula is also valid if
By repeated application of the last inequality, we find that
Since S ∪ B k ′ = B r k ′ and T is a tree, it follows that every B r k , k = 1, . . . , k ′ − 1, appears exactly once in the right-hand side, and we obtain 
Proof. Let S, T ⊂ N satisfy the conditions in Definition 5.1 with N \ T being a network. We first show that S ∩ T = ∅. Suppose S ∩ T = ∅. Take any i ′ ∈ S ∩ T . Since S \ T and T \ S are non-empty and (S \ T ) ∪ (T \ S) is a non-empty network, there exists i ∈ S \ T and j ∈ T \ S such that {i, j} ∈ L. Since both S and T are networks, there exists a path in S connecting i and i ′ and there exists a path in T connecting j and i ′ . This contradicts the fact that (N, v, L) is a game with cycle-free communication structure. From S ∩ T = ∅, it follows that S ⊂ N \ T. Since both N \ T and S ∪ T are networks, S ⊂ N \ T, and (N, L) is cycle-free, we must have T ∈ C L (N \ S).
The lemma shows that the condition v(S) + v(T ) ≤ v(S ∪ T ) only has to hold for any network S and any network T that is a component of (N \ S, L(N \ S)). Notice that for a game with cycle-free communication structure superadditivity requires that v(S) + v(T ) ≤ v(S ∪ T ) for any disjoint S and T such that S, T, and S ∪ T are networks. So, the next corollary follows immediately.
Corollary 5.6 A game with cycle-free communication structure (N, v, L) is link-convex if v is superadditive.
The following example illustrates that link-convexity is strictly weaker than superadditivity and also that the Myerson value may not be in the core if the game is link-conevex.
Example 5.7 (Path graph)
We consider the cycle-free graph on (N, L) with L = {{j, j + 1} | j = 1, . . . , n − 1}. In L the players are positioned along a path from 1 to n and any player is connected with his neighbors. In this case any non-empty network S is of the form S = [i, j], 
Indeed, all these inequalities are satisfied for the game. Observe that this game has a unique core element (0, 2, 4, 0)
⊤ .
The average tree solution for this game is equal to the average of the marginal contribution vectors of the spanning trees induced by the four admissible 4-tuples B 
Concluding remarks
In this paper the average tree solution is proposed for the class of all games with communication structure. This solution generalizes both the solution introduced by Herings et al. [9] for the class of games with cycle-free communication structure and the Shapley value for the class of games with complete communication structure. We introduce the condition of link-convexity under which the average tree solution is an element of the core. For the class of games with cycle-free communication structure, link-convexity is weaker than superadditivity. In general, link-convexity is weaker than convexity, and only coincides with it for games with complete communication structure. Following this study, Baron et al. [1] define and axiomatize the average tree solution for any class of spanning trees. They also investigate several properties of the average tree solution. In particular, they prove that the set of spanning trees induced by the class of admissible n-tuples of coalitions is the largest class of spanning trees satisfying that the corresponding average tree solution has the Harsanyi property.
